Abstract-Widespread and commercial usage of Wireless Sensor Networks is kept back by the lack of strong and easy to use security. The wide range of applications of WSNs implies different and often contradictory security requirements. This paper argues the need for a configurable security architecture for WSNs and presents a methodology and software implementation to determine the most resource efficient suite of security protocols for a given application.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a long incubation period of intensive hardware and software research, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are slowly moving towards commercial usage: academic applications have been deployed for years in uncontrolled environments, in order to determine the problems that arise in WSN deployments [1] . There are also larger scale, operational networks, like CitySense [2] which will provide a live coverage of the environment. There is a lot of interest and hype regarding WSNs however a major set-back which has not yet surfaced is the lack of strong and easy to use security. Despite a plethora of protocols in WSN literature, there are few actual usable implementations.
The main problem with security is that an entire suite of protocols is required: encryption, authentication, key management just form the basic set, which is followed by a number of protocols or techniques needed to defend against specific WSN attacks. Furthermore, two separate WSN applications will have different and often contradictory security requirements. As an example, consider military and smart-home applications: using the same cryptographic algorithms for both applications will either be too weak for the former or too strong for latter, where it would lead to waste of power and resources. This implies that developing a static security architecture (as proposed in [3] ) is not ideal, and instead the security should be determined for each particular application.
The subject of security configuration or management has not received much attention in research. We have an approach by Prasad and Alam [4] to select security primitives based on the security level, which in turn is determined by the application type. Ransom et al in [5] generate security models for the network defined by the user's parametrised description of the application, and present each model with a list of possible attacks, allowing the user to choose what he thinks is the safest model. Finally, Peter et al present configKit [6] , designed to help application developers find the configuration of security modules which resolves the hardware, energy and security requirements of the designed application. A simpler but more practical approach to security configuration is to use a configurable cipher, like RC5, and employ different numbers of rounds or key sizes, yielding different levels of security. An approach is presented in [7] .
Security configuration is the first step towards a proper security architecture for sensor networks. The determined suite of protocols needs to be incorporated into the application code with as little interference as possible. What is required is a basic modular security architecture built into the WSN operating system, where specific security protocols can be connected.
A configuration methodology that addresses some issues omitted by the previous approaches is presented in section II. The methodology is put to work in a scenario for medical applications. The configuration of specific WSN security issues is discussed in section III. Section IV explains what a complete architecture for WSNs should look like, and how the security configuration is integrated into it. The paper concludes in section V.
II. CONFIGURING SECURITY
The main concern of this paper is the difficulty of configuring security in a wireless sensor network. As previously stated, to perform this task extensive knowledge of the application, of WSNs and security is required. In this section a process that selects suitable security protocols for a given network deployment is presented.
A. Parameters
The analysis of WSN security lead to the conclusion that a set of parameters can be used to control the security requirements and identify protocols and schemes. These parameters are application type, number of nodes, topology dynamics, communication frequency, unattended functioning time, node performance and timing constraints, which describe the network model and the application, and power consumption per packet, attacks, environment security, data security, ciphers, semantic security, which are internal parameters and cannot be controlled by a network user. However, through further refinement, it is possible to express these internal parameters as functions of the application level parameters, in which case the security of the sensor network can be entirely configured by a non-expert user who only has knowledge of the application space.
Attacks are used to objectively compare the security of two similar protocols. A list of attacks and vulnerabilities has been compiled and ordered on the effort put on the attacker. The list in ascending order is: forward secrecy (FS), small group (SG), unknown key share (UKS), impersonation by signature forgery (SFImp), multiple session (MS), impersonation by forwarding (FImp), man in the middle (MiM), impersonation (Imp), denial of service (DoS), replay (Rep), key freshness (KF), type flaw (TF), and every attack is tagged with a number that indicates it's position in the list: FS is 1 and TF is 11 (replay and key freshness are considered to require the same effort). To determine the security of a protocol (and allow comparison), the values for all the attacks the protocol is vulnerable against are summed, which results in the total vulnerability: the lower this value, the more secure the protocol. Table I shows the vulnerabilities for the considered key establishment protocols.
B. Selecting Security Protocols
As observed in the previous section, all the security related decisions can be based on a set of parameters from application space, which allows a non-expert user to configure the network security just by describing the application. This facility is important, as the security requirements can change if the network becomes mobile or if the number of nodes is modified. To illustrate and test the concepts presented in this paper, a security configuration tool has been implemented. The application logic for the software tool is shown in figure 1 .
The tool uses a graphical interface to gather the user input that describes the application. This translates into the set of application parameters that were detailed above. It has been discussed that there are internal parameters that have to be determined as a function of the first set of parameters. In the application this is done with a generalised planning algorithm: the initial states are the set of application parameters and the goal is that all the parameters (application and internal) must be resolved. The value of an unresolved parameter can be determined only after all the dependencies are in turn resolved.
Once all the parameters are identified the suitable security protocols can be selected from an underlying database. The security configuration is based on the fact that every protocol can be identified by a set of (parameter, value) pairs, which can be matched by the application and internal parameters deduced from the user input. This is shown in table II which reflects the protocol described-by parameter relation of the database.
C. Scenario
A scenario will better explain the way security is configured based on application parameters. We consider a hospital where every room has a WSN of less than one hundred nodes, deployed on patients to monitor the vitals. Data should be reported to a central computer from each sensor every second, and the maximum time a patient is considered to stay in the hospital under monitoring is one month. The nodes are cheap and the hardware is low end, they are powered by two AA batteries giving roughly 3000 mAH each. The nodes should be mobile to allow patients to move around, and common sense dictates that a clustered topology should be used, with each patient being a cluster of sensors.
Since this is a medical application a high level of security is required and we consider the environment public (although it could also be trusted). The public environment eliminates master keys, and the clustered topology, hierarchical communication and node mobility restrict the choices to using server shared keys. Key establishment protocols are restricted to centralised distribution, and the safest protocol is found to be Wide Mouthed Frog, vulnerable only to multisession attacks. Next, for data security, the ciphers are determined from the performance, timing constraints and security level: we have to eliminate public algorithms and as medical applications require a high level of security we are left with AES. Therefore, we can choose the ZigBee security stack, as the others use either RC5 or Skipjack. We can also use the ZigBee data authentication, but for broadcast authentication our current selection of protocols does not provide one that uses AES. Therefore, the tool will present all the broadcast authentication protocols and the user can select one.
If the network was deployed with the same requirements but used for environment monitoring a low security level would be acceptable therefore the security tool would be able to select RC5 and Skipjack too. The choice between ZigBee, TinySec, MiniSec and SPINS would be made on the maximum consumption per packet and on the semantic security. The expected number of packets sent by a node is at least 2678400 (one packet per second a month), which eliminates TinySec whose IV of 16 bits overflows after 65536 packets. The maximum consumption per packet is 0.00224 mAH. Since MiniSec has a packet consumption of 0.000167 mAH and SPINS 0.000188 mAH, both protocols can be used. They are both resilient to replay attacks so the tool will recommend both, although since MiniSec is the only one implemented, it should be the only choice.
III. SECURITY PARTICULARITIES FOR SENSOR NETWORKS
The protocols considered so far for security configuration are mainly for traditionally understood communication security: confidentiality, authentication and integrity, and key management. Wireless sensor networks are subject to other threats that can't be countered with basic security primitives; there are two issues which are still an open problem: routing security, namely, worm holes, and aggregation security.
Routing worm holes are high speed data tunnels created by an attacker with two endpoints in different parts of the network, which give nodes around the two ends of the tunnel the false impression that they are neighbours. Basic security primitives have no effect on the attack, as packets are copied entirely and dispatched through the tunnel. The effect is a disruption of the routing protocol. The authors' conclusion is that measures to detect worm holes require centralisation of topology information, like geographic position of nodes, or distance between them [8] . As worm holes are an open problem, they are left out of the configuration process.
Aggregation reduces and evens traffic throughout the network as aggregator nodes (branching nodes in the aggregation tree), using an aggregation function (e.g. sum, average), will summarise the data from children nodes instead of forwarding all the messages towards the sink. Depending on the level of trust in nodes the following levels of threat are identified:
• all the nodes are trusted -could work with no additional security, but authentication should be used to prevent intransit data alteration; • aggregator nodes are compromised;
• any node can be compromised. Focus in literature is on the second and third levels. Against aggregator compromise there is an approach by Hu and Evans [9] . Aggregation security is very different if there is no trust in all network nodes, which can be the case if nodes are subject to capture, or their sensed values can be influenced by changing the environment around them. To detect misbehaving or malfunctioning nodes, a special algorithms is used to validate data for each type of aggregation function, as discussed in [10] . Complete security protocols are based on an aggregatecommit-prove sequence, as presented in [11] , [12] .
There is a fourth approach to aggregation security, in systems where data theft needs to be prevented. Data confidentiality is required and to eliminate the overhead of hop-byhop en/decryption homomorphic ciphers are used [13] , [14] . With homomorphic ciphers, E(m1⊗m2) = E(m1)⊕E(m2), where E is the encryption function, m the message, ⊗ the group operation for message space and ⊕ the group operation for ciphertext space; therefore using homomorphic ciphers, aggregation can be performed directly on ciphertexts.
Five levels of aggregation security are considered and classified according to the amount of communication and processing overhead, and the type of environment where the network is to be deployed.They are shown in the graph in figure 2 which connects the selection of aggregation security solutions with 
IV. INTEGRATED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
For reasons previously stated, wireless sensor networks should not have a static security architecture but a modular and dynamic one, where the most efficient protocol suite can be easily connected to the application code. In the following, the development process illustrated in figure 3 is elaborated upon, in order to determine specific architectural issues.
Following instructions from [15] it was established that security for a specific type of messages should be determined from message source network layer, application requirements and overall security configuration. When the application code is being developed, the programmer should indicate what type of data needs security, and, preferably, what class of security protocols should be applied. In order to minimise code changes the use of annotations is encouraged. In addition, the developer should indicate (also through annotations) what the individual communication layers are. This will be used to determine on which layer a specific message originates. This completes the role of the application developer.
Before installing (or updating) sensor firmware, the user must configure the security using the tool presented in the previous section. This tool can generate a security descriptor giving information about specific security protocols to be used with the application. With this descriptor and the information provided through annotations, the security protocols can be retrieved from a generic repository and connected to the application code.
For a simplified architecture only the basic security services are considered: confidentiality, authentication and key management. The complexity comes from being able to apply the first two at different layers in the communication stack, with different levels of security: for example, the application might demand link-layer security with a network key, but also a higher level of security with pair-wise keys for the application message. Performing security processing of the data on every communication layer can lead to redundancy and great resource waste in sensor networks. As described by Filman and Linden in [16] , a centralised approach to security has many advantages. Security agents can interact in key sharing, voting algorithms, intrusion detection, etc. So redundancy can be eliminated by processing the contents of the message only once, with the highest determined level of security. This implies that the processing should happen at the lowest communication layer possible, and no more security operations are performed afterwards. Since MAC layers often have specific headers it is best to perform security processing right above this. The downside would be that performance hacks as employed in TinySec [17] , where the message is processed while sending packet preamble to reduce timing overhead, will not be possible. Complex techniques could overcome this, using a scheduler and delayed message processing, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Before dispatching the message to the MAC layer, information should be included to indicate what security services need to be performed when the message is received at the other end.
The second part of the architecture is key management. A single entity should manage a database of keys, which are obtained or updated using key establishment protocols. An interesting subject is how key predistribution can be automated for large batches of nodes, by installing keys in predefined addresses in the compiled binary.
The main concern of this envisioned modular architecture is to interfere and change existing code as little as possible. The constraints placed on application code are the annotations. Also, security protocols that provide a certain service should implement a predefined service interface. This means that available protocols like TinySec or MiniSec [18] would need to be restructured and refactored to fit into the architecture.
These observations are currently explored by the authors towards the implementation of the security architecture for the TinyOS operating system.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper envisions a modular security architecture that can provide strong and easy to use security for all the different applications of wireless sensor networks. In addition, it provides a concrete methodology together with a software implementation to determine the most efficient suite of security protocols that satisfies the requirements of a given application.
The authors are currently working on implementing the envisioned security architecture in the TinyOS sensor node operating system.
